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  In this article we analyze the determinants of the functional distribution of 
government expenditure using for this purpose the models of the median voter's demand 
common in public choice literature. First of all, we review the economic literature on the 
factors affecting each component of government expenditure. Then, secondly, we develop 
a demand model of expenditure structure and we estimate the demand equations system 
for the sample of OECD countries in the period 1970-1997. The results reveal that, besides 
income and prices, institutional factors, population density and its age structure have 
significant effects on the composition of government expenditure. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
  The recent models of government expenditure and economic growth developed by 
Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996) point to the functional composition of 
government expenditure as a decisive factor. These authors distinguish between the 
functions of productive character that stimulate growth and the non-productive ones that 
increase social welfare. They also reach the conclusion that there is a functional 
distribution of spending that maximizes growth. Hence, we might expect that, inasmuch as 
the elasticities of each function with regard to growth are similar in one country and 
another, governments would tend towards compositions of government expenditures that 
are also similar. Sanz and Velázquez (2001), however, confirm that, although there has 
been an alignment in the structure of government expenditure by functions over the last 
thirty years in the OECD, this convergence has been conditional rather than absolute. 
 
  Now, in this article we use the most widespread theoretical model, that of the 
median voter, to ascertain what that factors are that determine the composition of 
government expenditures by functions and which may therefore be impeding this 
alignment. The conclusions that are obtained will therefore be of g reat interest as, in 
accordance with the afore-mentioned models, the determinants of the functional structure 
of government expenditure have a direct impact on economic growth. What is more, in the 
case of variables in which governments have little room for manoeuvre, they could be one 
of the factors that explain the varying growth rates recorded by countries. 
 
  In order to investigate all these aspects, in section 2 we review the theoretical and 
empirical evidence regarding determinants of each one of the functions of public spending. 
We go on to set forth the theoretical framework of median voter demand models, 
following in the footsteps of the pioneering studies of Bocherding and Deacon (1972), 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and the most recent one of Gemmel et al. (1999), brought 
into line with the different functions under consideration. In section 4, we perform an 





government expenditure in the OECD countries over the last thirty years. Finally, in 
section 5, we draw the most significant conclusions. 
 
2.  Determinants of public spending functions 
 
  The literature analyzing government expenditure determinants has focused on 
explaining the size of the public sector or one of its components separately (Tridimas, 
2001). Now, in this section we review the main studies that have analyzed the factors 
determining every one of the functions of government expenditure so as to obtain a set of 
determinants that are common to all of them. In this respect, the functions will be arranged 
in the order introduced by Oxley and Martin (1991), Saunders (1993), Bleaney et al. 
(1999), which may be seen in table 1. 
 
  [See Table 1] 
 
  Now, income is singled out as the first and foremost of all the government 
expenditure functions, almost always with a positive elasticity. Thus, in defence and public 
order and security it increases the resources for providing protection while at the same time 
raising the cost of an attack (Murdoch and Sandler, 1984, 1985, 1990, Okamura, 1991, 
Pradhan and Ravallion, 1998, and Sezgin, 2000)
1. In merit goods - health, education and 
housing - a wide range of studies find elasticities greater than one, revealing their luxury 
good nature (Newhouse, 1977, 1987, Leu, 1986, Gerdtham el al., 1992, Falch and Rattso, 
1997, Hitiris, 1999, Snyder and Yackovlev, 2000, and Heshmati, 2001). 
 
  However, Culyer (1988), McGuire et al. (1993), Gerdtham et al. (1994), Hansen 
and King (1996), Fernández and Rogerson (1997) and Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998) 
contend that this outcome may be due to the omission of variables, failure to utilize the 
cross-section variation, the possibility of spurious relations, and the absence of regional 
disaggregation of spending. Thus, Manning et al. (1987), Gbesemete and Gerdtham 
                                                 
1Fritz-Assmus and Zimmerman (1990) and Bairam (1995), however, do not find a significant effect. 





(1992), Gerdtham et al. (1994), Murthy and Ukpolo (1994), Borge and Rattso (1995), 
Fernández and Rogerson (1997) and Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998) find an elasticity that 
is lower or not significantly different from unity. 
 
  Similarly, Tait and Heller (1982), Randolph et al. (1996), Canning and Pedroni 
(1999) and Fay (2000) find that spending on economic services, including those relating to 
transport and communications, responds primarily and directly to per capita income 
changes. With regard to interest payment and contrary to the other public spending 
functions, per capita income has an inverse effect on debt service as it lowers the country's 
risk or premium. Lastly, per capita income level assists the generation of wider social 
security coverage, whilst concern for aspects relating to inequality (Tait and Heller, 1982, 
Atkinson, 1995, Concialdi, 1999). 
 
  In relation to prices, government competes with the private sector in a large 
number of markets. In this way, the significant variable will be the public price in relation 
to the private, which to some extent will reflect the relative efficiency of the public sector. 
Citizens will therefore demand more public goods only if the State is capable of producing 
them efficiently. Now, as suggested by Baumol (1967), in the public sector the wages and 
salary component is greater than in the private, which causes productivity to rise less and 
inflation more. This circumstance is finally reflected in an increase in the share of 
government expenditure in the GDP when both variables are measured in nominal terms, 
which has a varying impact on each function (Mueller, 1989). In addition, the difficulty of 
obtaining the prices of the public goods of each type of function and their relation to the 
private ones lies in the fact that the majority of empirical studies do not include this 
variable, so the ratio is assumed to remain constant in time. With regard to studies that 
have estimated this relationship, Okamura (1991) finds an unexpected positive elasticity 
for defense. Gerdtham et al. (1992), do not find a significant effect of the ratio Purchasing 
Power Standard (PPS) for health and GDP on per capita health spending. As for 
educational expenditure, many studies agree on the fact that it is inelastic (Rubinfeld and 
Shapiro, 1989, Aronsson and Wikström, 1996, Falch and Rattso, 1997, Dahlberg and 






  Insofar as demographic variables are concerned, population and its density play a 
highly important role in per capita spending on the purest or non-rival goods, such as 
defense and transport and communications, as well as merit goods and the other economic 
services, showing negative elasticities
2 (Murdoch and Sandler, 1985, Murdoch and 
Sandler, 1990, Gerdtham et al., 1992, Randolph et al., 1996, Fernández and Rogerson, 
1997, Clements et al., 1998, Falch and Rattso, 1999, Fay, 2000, and Heshmati, 2001). 
There is evidence, therefore, that the provision of these public services makes it possible to 
take advantage of economies of scale, whilst they also have a public dimension. On the 
other hand, density raises housing expenditure, as it increases the support required from the 
public sector (Curie and Yelowitz, 2000). 
 
  Population age structure also proves significant for many functions. Thus, Marlow 
and Shiers (1999) suggest that, in respect of spending connected with public order and 
security and defence, the bulk of illegal actions are committed by individuals between 18-
25 years old. The youngest and the oldest increase spending on health, housing and social 
security since they are the ones who make most use of health services and the ones who 
benefit most from public pension and welfare systems (Heller et al., 1986, Hagemann and 
Nicoletti, 1989, Murthy and Ukpolo, 1994, Di Matteo and Di Matteo, 1998, Hitiris, 1999 
and Curie and Yelowitz, 2000). Now, some studies contend that health spending does not 
depend so much on the patient's age as on the time remaining until death (Kleiman, 1974, 
Leu, 1986, Hitiris and Posnett, 1992, Gerdtham et al., 1994, and Blomqvist and Carter, 
1997). In the case of social security, moreover, governments may well bring in reforms to 
forestall the impact of population ageing on pensions, in addition to the fact that certain of 
its items, such as unemployment benefit, are allocated to the economically active 
population, i.e. people between the ages of 15 and 64. (Than Dang et al., 2001). 
 
                                                 
2Leu (1986), however, points out that density may also lead to increase expenditure on health as the risk of 
infection is greater, whilst at the same time reducing the transport time and costs to consume health services 
(Kleiman, 1974). Indeed, Chawla et al. (1998) do not find a significant effect for the concentration of 
population in urban areas. In addition, Marlow and Shiers (1999) suggest that density may increase 
education spending as its production costs are higher in metropolitan areas. 





  In education, Marlow and Shiers (1999) and Ahlin and Johansson (2001) point out 
that, in the framework of the median voter model, a rise in the proportion of young people 
will generate pressure by their parents for increases in public spending on education. 
However, Poterba (1997), Fernandez and Rogerson (1997), Marlow and Shiers themselves 
(1999) and Painter and Bae (2001) do not find empirical evidence of this impact, while 
they are joined by Falch and Rattso (1997) in underlining the negative influence of the 
proportion of the population aged over 65.  
 
  As for institutional factors, Hicks and Kubisch (1984), Smith (1989) and Looney 
and Mehay (1990) state that the budget process has a significant impact on military 
spending. The size of the public sector and its degree of decentralisation also have a 
decisive effect on merit goods and on economic services and other expenditure (Gerdtham 
et al., 1994, Murthy and Upkolo, 1994, Randolph et al., 1996, Falch and Rattso, 1997, 
Mongelli, 1997, Clements et al., 1998, Falch and Rattso, 1999,  Marlow and Shiers, 1999, 
Snyder and Yackovelev, 2000 and Heshmati, 2001)
3. Lastly, institutional factors affect 
social security spending, sometimes to the extent of being as important as income (Hicks 
and Swank, 1992 and Alesina, 1999). 
 
  Functions also prove to be complementary or substitutive to a certain degree. 
Indeed, Heller and Diamond (1990) and Clements et al. (1998) find that the significance of 
the other functions increases the magnitude of economic services and of social security 
spending. Likewise, Looney (1997) claims that defence and infrastructure spending are 
competitors, whilst Marlow and Shiers (1999) show that expenditure on education is 
complementary to that on defence and public order and security. 
 
   Alongside these variables common to the vast majority of the functions we find 
others more specific to each one. Thus, fiscal policy - the budgetary stability processes 
primarily - affects defence, education and transport and communications (Looney and 
Mehay, 1990, Murdoch and Sandler, 1990, Randolph et al., 1996, Falch and Rattso, 1997, 
                                                 
3However, Hitiris and Posnett (1992), Di Matteo (2000) and Snyder and Yackovelev (2000) do not find 





Marlow and Shiers, 1999, Jonakin and Stephens, 1999). Unemployment affects social 
security directly (Wright, 1985) and public order and security and education indirectly 
(Falch and Rattso, 1997, Marlow and Shiers, 1999, Snyder and Yackovelev, 2000, Painter 
and Bae, 2001). Inequality is a factor to be taken into account in spending on public order 
and security, housing and social security (Lindert, 1996, Perotti, 1996, Curie and Yelowitz, 
2000, Pradham and Ravallion, 1998, Snyder and Yackovelev, 2000, and Moene and 
Wallerstein, 2001). The stock  or flow of previous years' spending to some extent 
determines the amount of resources allocated to public order and security and health
4 
(Gerdtham et al. 1994, Murthy and Ukpolo, 1994, Pradham and Ravallion, 1998 and Di 
Matteo and Di Matteo, 1998). Lastly, the defence spending of both allies and enemies 
affects each country's military budget
5. 
 
  In short, seven variables appear repeatedly as determinants of the government 
expenditures functions: income, prices, population, its density and age structure, 
institutional factors, and the other functions, reflecting the mutual interrelation that exists 
between them. In this way, table 2 shows a synoptic chart of the determinants found. 
Insofar as the estimation method is concerned, many studies concur in pointing out that 
panel data techniques combine utilisation of the time series, which takes dynamic effects 
into account, and the cross-section series, avoiding to overestimate elasticities. 
 
[See Table 2] 
 
  3.  Theoretical model 
 
  The base model that will be used to analyze the determinants of public spending by 
functions will be the median voter model, developed from the studies of Bocherding and 
                                                 
4However, other empirical studies (Newhouse, 1992, Chawla et al., 1998) find no evidence of this effect on 
health spending. 
5In fact, both in the public good model, based on the study by Olsen and Zeckhauser (1966), and in the club 
good model (Murdoch and Sandler, 1984), which incorporates the possibility that allied spending may be 
complementary, the demand for defence goods and services is determined in accordance with income, price 
per unit of military activity, and the level chosen by allies and enemies (see Sandler and Hartley, 2001, for a 
recent survey). 





Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). In this model it is assumed that 
citizens vote by means of a majority system and that the size of the public sector is the only 
issue to be decided. It may be inferred from this approach, therefore, that the magnitude of 
government expenditure will be a function of the median voter's preferences and income 
together with his perception of the public/private sector price ratio. In fact, the function of 
the median voter's demand for government expenditure will be expressed by: 
 
b a




Gi: quantity of public goods and services demanded by the voter-taxpayer i. 
Pgi: tax-price as perceived by the voter-taxpayer i. 
Yi: voter-taxpayer's i income. 
a y b: income and price elasticities. 
 
  Now, the price to be paid for public goods and services may be specified as: 
 
h CN T P i gi =





Ti: voter-taxpayer's i share in total tax revenue. 
C: cost of a unit of public goods and services. 
N: population 
h: degree of congestion of public goods and services. 
 
  Bocherding and Deacon (1972) assume that there is no discrimination (Ti = 1/N), 
then Pgi = CN
(ç-1) and substituting (2) in (1) we would get: 
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  However, the voter-taxpayer's i consumption of public goods and services is not 
just the level of per capita public spending, but it also affects its degree of rivalry and 
congestion, i.e.: 
 




G: total public spending in real terms. 
 
  Note that if h is zero, it is a case of a pure public good or service, whereas if it is 
unity, it will be a private one. Furthermore, Gemmell et al. (1999) argue that with this 
specification the assumption is that the public/private sector price ratio remains constant. 
To enable this ratio to be modified in the course of time
6, relative prices (C/Px, where Px is 
the price of the private sector) are included. Finally, the data relating to total public 
spending in real terms in the theoretical model (G) would be the nominal expenditure (E) 
divided by the tax price (Pgi). The data that is observed, however, is the nominal 
expenditure divided by the unit cost of G (C). Therefore, taking this circumstance into 
consideration, substituting (4) in (3) and aggregating to express the demand function for 
the total government expenditure, we get the expression: 
 
f b a N P aY G r =                                                                                                        (5) 
 
  where: 
 
  a h h b f - + - + = ) 1 )( 1 (  
                                                 





  Y: total income of the country 
 
  This is the theoretical framework used in the vast majority of empirical studies 
analyzing the demand for public goods and services and which are based on the median 
voter model. In this study, we make three contributions to this model. First of all, the 
degree of consumption of every type of public good or service by the voter-taxpayer i will 
also be in accordance with the population of his same characteristics with which he has to 
share that category of spending. To be specific, the demographic feature that appears to 
have the strongest effect on determination of government expenditure is the age structure 
of the population (Gemmel et al., 1999)
7. In fact, these authors state that the omission of 
this variable may generate an upward bias in the estimation of the total population 
parameter. 
 
  Secondly, population density is included as the utility of public goods and services 
also depends on the spatial distribution of the population. In fact, Mueller (1989) points out 
that the actual definition of public goods and services and externalities connotes 
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where: 
  N1, N2, N3 population in the age interval 0-15 years, 16-64 years and over 64. 
  S: surface. 
 
                                                 
7Thus, the larger the percentage of population aged over 65 is, the higher the social security spending that 
will be demanded by the voter-taxpayer i. In education the relevant variable for measuring congestion will 





  and substituting (6) in (1), following the same steps as the restricted model without 
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where: 
  Y : mean per capita income. 
  h h b f + - + = ) 1 )( 1 (  
  i i h b f ) 2 ( + =  
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  Finally, the model is used to explain each one of the eight functions that have been 
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   f =1,2,…..8; ￿Gf=G                   (8) 
In this way, every type of expenditure is allowed to have a different elasticity in respect of 
one of the determinants specified (Bairam, 1995)
9. Now supposed that voters choose the 
share of public spending they want to assign to a given function in separate ballots, taking 
into account their preferences amongst all the functions. Then dividing expression (8) by 
(7) and rearranging the terms, we get: 
 
                                                 
8Other studies of the allocation of public expenditure are those that follow the consumer demand theory 
(Pitarakis and Tridimas, 1999) in which government maximizes a utility function. Tridimas (2001), elaborates 
a model where public expenditure structure is not only the outcome of a optimizing policy but also of the 
optimization of individual voter utility functions.  
9 In the demand function for every type of expenditure contained in the expression (8), the ideal thing would 
be to specify the prices of each expenditure function. However, this series is not available for the time period 
1970-1997 and for all the OECD countries. Hence it is assumed that the deflators of each function are the 
same as that of the total public deflator. 
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f = 1,2,…..8;   ￿ Gf = G                                                                                                     (9) 
 
  Note that it is a case of an elasticity relative to that of the total government 
expenditure, so that a null value should not be interpreted as that the determinant does not 
affect the demand for the public good, but that it does not do so in a way significantly 
different from the rest of government expenditure. Expressing it in logarithmic form, the 
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4.  Econometric analysis 
 
  Expression (10) will be estimated using the data from the OECD publication 
National Accounts. Volume II: Detailed Tables. This source is chosen inasmuch as it offers 
information on the consolidated spending of all levels of government and, in addition, it 
follows the accrual criterion. Data from national agencies, OECD and World Bank country 
reports, Eurostat: General Government Accounts and Statistics and the IMF publication: 





OECD data to obtain longer statistical series and supplement the informative shortcomings 
of the basic sources
10. 
 
  The structure of government expenditures by functions is calculated at current 
prices, assuming that prices among all expenditure functions are the same. Therefore, the 
shares of total public spending of each function will reflect the opportunity cost of not 
having assigned those resources to another function. The public/private sector price ratio is 
obtained as the public/private sector deflator ratio (weighted mean of investments, 
consumption and public transfers, the latter represented by the consumer price index), both 
obtained from the OECD: Economic Outlook. The per capita income (in Purchasing Power 
Parities of the 1995 dollar and in real terms of that year) and population series are obtained 
from the OECD: National Accounts: Volume I. Main Aggregates, while the population 
age structure is taken from the OECD: Labour Force Statistics. Some countries did not 
have data prior to 1975 and have had to be completed using domestic sources. 
 
  Panel data techniques are going to be used for the estimation of the expression (10), 
since, as already mentioned in the second paragraph, it enables the dynamic effects to be 
captured without overestimating the elasticities of each determinant. In addition, the 
individual effects of each country will be of great use for collecting, amongst others, the 
institutional factors of great importance in the share of each function in government 
expenditures, thereby preventing bias in the estimations. However, it will not be possible 
to infer from the results what exactly those factors are, just their significance. 
 
  Note, moreover, that in fact it is the estimation of a system composed of eight 
equations, one for every spending function, so two problems arise. First of all, these 
equations are related as, when deciding the percentages that are assigned to each function, 
voters at the same time take into account their preferences with regard to all the functions 
                                                 
10Although IMF data covers a longer period of time, it is not as a rule consolidated for all the Public 
Administrations, so it has been necessary to separate the transfers from among the different administrative 
levels (see Easterly and Rebelo, 1993, for a discussion on the limitations of the data of this publication). 
Furthermore, it uses the cash criterion, hence its information has been used only to estimate the evolution of 





and, therefore, contemporary errors are correlated. Secondly, the inclusion of income as a 
determinant of the shares achieved by each function introduces endogenicity. In fact, 
Devarajan et al. (1996) and Gemmel et al. (1999) show that the composition of public 
spending is a highly significant factor in economic growth
11. This is why we have 
proceeded to estimate by the three stages least squares method. At the initial stage we have 
used the per capita physical capital stock
12 and the share of public spending in the GDP as 
instrument variables of the per capita income. In this way, at a second stage, we performed 
an OLS-type two-stage estimation of the covariance matrix of the disturbance. Finally, we 
performed a GLS-type estimation using the covariance matrix of the previous step. Note 
that since each equation has the same set of right-hand-side variables, the regression results 
are the same as for the second step. But we obtain the correlation matrix of the residuals 
between equations and perform a Breusch-Pagan test for independent equations, taking 
into account that the disturbance covariance matrix may not be diagonal.  
 
  Now, in table 3 we may observe the results obtained, wherein, as already 
mentioned, the elasticities of each function have to be interpreted in relation to those of 
total government expenditure. Thus, first of all, we carried out a Hausman Test of the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the unobservable effects and the explanatory 
variables, or what amounts to the same, the OLS including dummies per country
13. If the 
hypothesis is rejected, we choose the single unbiased estimator (within estimates). This 
first result confirms the importance and significance of institutional factors in determining 
the composition of government expenditures. Secondly, the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the 
hypothesis of independent equations, i.e. the disturbance covariance is not diagonal. As a 
                                                 
11This potential source of endogenicity, however, is reduced if we bear in mind that the effect of the 
distribution of public spending is not immediate but takes several years to become apparent. 
12Each country's private physical stock is obtained using Gross Formation of Fixed Capital and its deflator 
series from the OECD publication: National Accounts: Volume I. Main Aggregates, by means of the 
perpetual inventory method and using a depreciation rate of 10%. 
13For the case of social security, the null hypothesis is rejected only at 10% significance. However, we 
decided to introduce country dummies for this function as well, as at all events it impairs the efficiency of 
estimation but assures its consistency. Arellano's test (1990) also rejects the absence of correlation between 
the regressive variables and the unobservable effects for most of the functions. T his test consists of 
comparing the coefficients in levels and first differences, so that if these are different the hypothesis of 
absence of correlation between unobservable effects and explanatory variables is rejected, which would 
mean the existence of significant individual effects. 





result we confirm that voters take into account their preferences in respect of all the 
functions when demanding each one. 
 
[See Table 3] 
 
  By determinants we obtain that income elasticity is higher in the case of health and 
social security, which suggests that more developed societies have a preference for a more 
equitable distribution. This result confirms that Wagner's law is especially applicable for 
these two functions (Solano, 1983, and Saunders, 1993). On the other hand, other 
expenditure, defence and, above all, housing present the lowest elasticities, confirming that 
the most prosperous countries are less affected by debt servicing, as they have a lower risk 
premium. As regards the public/private sector price ratio the estimation shows that those 
functions in which the wages and salary component or transfers predominate, as is the case 
of education, health and social security, they are less elastic, as a reflection of the lower 
competitiveness of the private sector in this area and in which, Baumol's conjecture is 
further reinforced. This result coincides with the studies that have analyzed the elasticity of 
public spending on education in relation to prices (Rubinfeld and Shapiro, 1989, Aronsson 
and Wikström, 1996, Falch and Rattso, 1997, Boije, 1997, Dahlberg and Jacob, 2000, and 
Ahlin and Johansson, 2001). On the other hand, housing is more elastic as individuals can 
more easily resort to t he private sector in the light of increases of the prices in the 
production of public services. In addition, the higher share of investments reduce the 
exposure of this type of expenditure to Baumol's conjecture. 
 
  On the other hand, population rises will have an impact on the share of each 
function in two ways: directly, measured by the population coefficient, and indirectly by 
virtue of the elasticity of density. Thus, the net effect will be negative on the importance of 
defence, health, other expenditure and, in particular, on transport and communications, 
confirming the results of Murdoch and Sandler, (1985), Randolph et al., (1996) and 
Heshmati (2001). These functions reveal, therefore, that they are the ones that have a more 
purely public nature. At the other extreme, housing reveals a positive relative elasticity, as 





population density and its age structure prove to be significant determinants in the 
composition of government expenditures. 
 
  In fact, population density is significant for the majority of functions. Its effect on 
housing is very important and positive, which may suggest that the government is forced to 
intervene in this market when increases take place in the concentration of population and, 
therefore, in the high cost of land. In addition, a high density entails the implementation of 
measures in the area of urban planning. Similarly, it has a positive impact on the share of 
defence and the public services, so it is possible to deduce that security increases in 
importance in countries in which the population is concentrated. Health and above all 
transport and communications and other expenditure have a significantly lower elasticity 
than the other functions. We are therefore talking of types of spending that make it 
possible to take advantage on economies of scale, confirming the results found by 
Gerdtham et al. (1992) and Randolph et al. (1996). 
 
  As regards population age structure, the importance of the over-64 segment 
increases the share of the housing function, which suggests that funds of this type are 
allotted mainly to older people, an outcome that was pointed out by Curie and Yelowitz 
(2000). In addition, and as was to be expected, this segment raises the expenditure 
allocated to social security through the increase in pensions. In other respects and if the 
pattern of recent years continues, this increase will take place at the expense of spending 
on public order and security. No significant effect is found, however, of the older 
population on the health share, which confirms the results found by Kleiman (1974), Leu 
(1986), Hitiris and Posnett (1992), Gerdtham et al. (1994) and Blomqvist and Carter 
(1997). On the basis of this evidence the decline in spending may be found as indicated by 
Fuchs (1990) in line with the "compression of morbidity" theory, namely that the effect of 
population ageing on spending has been attenuated by the lengthening of life.  
 
  For its part, the percentage of the population aged under 15 has an even greater 
impact on the distribution of public spending by functions. It has a positive effect on the 





the elasticity of the young population is greater in respect of this function than that found 
for the over-64 segment, which suggests that the economic literature has underestimated 
the importance of expenditure relating to family benefits. Education and health also display 
a positive elasticity, although only 10% significant, i.e. contrary to the majority of 
economic literature (Poterba, 1997, Fernández and Rogerson, 1997, Marlow and Shiers, 
1999, and Painter and Bae, 2001), scant evidence has been found of the effect of the school 
population on education spending
14, while it is confirmed that the early years of life entail 
higher health spending. The other expenditure category has a negative elasticity of great 
magnitude in respect of the young population, which indicates that ageing may increase its 
importance in detriment to the other functions. 
 
  In short, along with income and prices, institutional factors, density and population 
age structure and the mutual interrelations between functions prove highly significant in 
determining the composition of government expenditures. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
  In this study we have analyzed the determining factors of the composition of 
government expenditures using the median voter demand models common in the public 
choice literature. Thus, following the models of Bocherding and Deacon (1972), 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and Gemmell (1999), for the size of the public sector we 
have obtained an expression of a demand function of the shares of each one of the 
components of government expenditures. In addition, we have carried out a review of the 
economic literature with regard to the factors that affect each component of government 
expenditures and we have reached the conclusion that, besides income and prices, 
population density and its age structure, institutional factors and the interrelations between 
functions play a very significant role in the majority of functions. In the same way, from a 
                                                 
14In fact, Marlow and Shiers (1999) contend that this result may be due to the fact that, besides the young 
population, it is important to know its distribution by ages, as the spending per pupil at secondary level is 
much higher than at primary. It would also be necessary to include the population aged between 16-25, since 
a significant proportion continue their education at public institutions. This information is not available, 
however, on a yearly basis for all the OECD countries since 1970.  





theoretical standpoint, population density and age structure include the concepts of 
geographic proximity and publicity in the utilisation of pure public goods and services. 
Hence we have enlarged the median voter model with the incorporation of these variables 
so as to reflect the degree of congestion of public goods and services in a more appropriate 
and comprehensive way. 
 
  We have then estimated the demand equations system for a sample composed of 
the OECD countries during the period 1970-1997. This estimation pointed first of all to the 
existence of institutional factors that capture the idiosyncratic preferences of government 
expenditures for each country. Secondly, we also confirm the dependence of each one of 
the equations, confirming the mutual interrelation of each of the functions. As regards the 
elasticity estimations, income elasticity proves to be higher in the case of the functions 
most closely related to the Welfare State, social security and health, showing that the most 
developed countries display a stronger preference for a more equitable distribution. Along 
with education, these functions are also the least elastic in relation to the relative prices as a 
reflection of the lower competitiveness of the private sector in these areas, of the 
importance of the wages and salary component, and of public transfers, which expose them 
to a greater extent to Baumol's conjecture. Transport and communications and defence are 
the ones that reveal their purer public good character. Together with these traditional 
variables in the median voter models, we also confirm that both population density and age 
structure have significant effects on the percentage achieved by many of the functions 
considered. In fact, from the results obtained we may deduce that if the ageing patterns of 
recent times continue in the developed countries, other expenditure and housing will 
become of increasing importance in detriment to public order and security, defence, 
education and health. 
 
  Now, the importance of the idiosyncratic effects of each country and of the 
demographic variables restrict the amount of room for manoeuvre that governments have 
in choosing the composition of government expenditure that they want. This outcome has 
two major implications. In fact, the recent models of Devarajan et al. (1996) and Bleaney 





functions in economic growth. Hence, first of all, the variables beyond government control 
may be preventing it from having the optimum composition and therefore retarding 
growth. Secondly, it is inferred that no convergence process may be expected in the public 
spending structures of countries as this is impeded by institutional factors and demographic 
variables. In this way, if the various functions of spending have a different elasticity in 
respect of economic growth, the countries of the OECD area will not achieve similar rates 
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Breusch-Pagan Test (chi28) 1079,069 p-value:0,0000 
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